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ORGANIZING THE CORPORATION UNDER
THE NEW KENTUCKY BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT-A COMPARISON WITH
PRIOR LAW
The scope of this article will be limited to the organizational
aspects of corporations, with primary emphasis on the prerequisites
for obtaining corporate existence. It will attempt to demonstrate to
the practitioner the procedural and substantive impact of the new
law on his role as corporate organizer. The changes and/or similar-
ities will be noted by comparing the old statute with the new law,
relying on the official comments of the Model Business Corporation
Act and case law of those states which have adopted the act to
determine its effect on Kentucky corporation law.
SCOPE AND PURPOSES OF THE Acr
The new Kentucky Business Corporation Act,1 like its predecessor, 2
is of general application 3 and governs "any corporation formed under
the laws of this state." The act makes exception, however, for those
special corporations whose statutes are either inconsistent with the
general corporation act or state that its provisions do not apply.4
The exception is necessary for non-stock, nonprofit corporations,5
insurance corporations and professional service corporations 7 which
have their own separate statutory provisions which must be consulted
along with the general corporation law. The new act permits corpora-
tions to be formed for "any lawful purpose"8 and in that respect is
identical to old Kentucky law.9
APPLICATION TO EXISTING CoRIPoAnTIoNs
The new corporation law regulates all corporations in existence
on June 30, 1972 in so far as it can be applicable. 10 Essentially, this
1 Ky. R-av. STAT. ANN. § 271A.000 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRSA].
2Ky. Rlv. STAT. § 271.000 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 KRSA § 271A.015(1).
4Id.5 KRS § 273.150.
6 KRS § 304.24-030.
7 KRS § 274.015.8 KRSA § 271A.015(2).
9 KRS § 271.025.
1o XRSA § 271A.675(1).
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means that any acts performed by the corporation subsequent to
June 30, 1972, will be governed by the new statute; but it is not
necessary to make any changes in the corporation's activities prior to
that date in order to comply with new statutory provisions. All
domestic corporations which are listed in the corporate index in the
office of the Secretary of State on the effective date of the act, and
which are engaged in the usual course of their business on that date,
are validated retroactively to their incorporation date. This valida-
tion is to continue for the duration stated in the articles, or one year,
whichever is longer, unless the corporation is voluntarily dissolved
or has its powers revoked.-- The effect of this provision is to provide
at least one year of grace for existing corporations under the new law,
even though their stated duration may expire within a period of less
than a year. Provision is also made for the retention of existing
registered offices 1 2 and process agents.13 No positive action, such as
amending the articles of incorporation 14 to comply with the new
provisions, is required of existing corporations. In fact, the additional
corporate powers granted by the new act are automatically conferred
upon those entitles incorporated prior to the effective date.'5 How-
ever, practitioners should take note of the new provision concerning
the form of stock certificates which is effective for all certificates
issued after June 30, 1972.16
INCORPOBATOBS
Prior Kentucky law permitted any natural person of the age of 18
years or older or any corporation to serve as an incorporator.' 7 Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes Annotated [hereinafter KRSA] § 271A.265
deleted the age and natural person requirements providing that:
One or more persons, including without limitation a domestic or
foreign corporation, may act as incorporator or incorporators by
signing and delivering in triplicate to the Secretary of State articles
of incorporation for such corporation.' 8
The significance of the change obviously depends on the construction
of the term "person," and at the public hearings19 held on the proposed
11 KRSA § 271A.690.
12 KRSA § 271A.675(2).
13 KRSA § 271A.675(3).
14 KSA § 271A.675 (4).
15 KRSA § 271A.675(5).
16KRSA § 271A.675(6), (7).
17 KRS § 271.025.
18 KRSA § 271A.265.
19 KENTucKY LEGISLATIVE BESEAECH CoMmIssIoN, INFOnmATIONAL BULL.
No. 88, LEGISLATIVE HEARING: CORPORATION LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited as
LEGIsLATrvE HEARING].
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revision of the general corporation law, this provision was the subject
of considerable discussion. The suggestion was made that "person"
be defined broadly to include partnership, joint venture and unin-
corporated association, or alternatively, that the statute specify that
natural persons of the age of 18 years or older, joint ventures, partner-
ships, unincorporated associations, and corporations, foreign or
domestic, may serve as incorporators.20 The goal of the proponents
of these changes was to make it clear that a person under the age of
18 could not act as an incorporator and, in addition, to specifically
allow partnerships, joint ventures and unincorporated associations to
serve as incorporators.2 1 However, these attempts were unsuccessful
and the proposals were not adopted in the final bill.22 The new
provision as enacted incorporates the philosophy of the Model Act,
i.e., "that the role of incorporators is neither significant nor lasting
in effect and that it is now little more than a ritual making it unneces-
sary to specify age."23 The insignificance of the incorporators role is
demonstrated further by the widespread custom of using "dummy
incorporators" to satisfy statutory requirements pertaining to numbers
of incorporators, either for convenience or where the real parties in
interest are unable to serve as incorporators.24 Recognizing this
custom, the new act does not require that the incorporators subscribe
to a minimum number of shares of stock in the new corporation, a
requisite under the previous statute.
25
With respect to the ability of partnerships, joint ventures, or
unincorporated associations to serve as incorporators, it appears that
they are not encompassed in the statutory term "person"26 and
20 LEGISLATIVE HEAIUNGS, supra note 19, at 6.
21 Id.
22 KRSA § 271A.265.
23 MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 53 ff 2 (1971). Contra, W. F cEcmm,
PRrvATE CoR'oPAnoNs § 81 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1963). The age of legal majority
is defined by statute as 18 except for the purchase of alcoholic beverages and for
the purposes of care and treatment of handicapped children. KRS § 2.015 (1971).
See Commonwealth v. Hallahan, 391 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1965), holding that KRS§ 2.015 applies where a statute does not designate age in a precise number of
years; Ky. Op. A7rY GEN. 360 (1967).2 4 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW oF ComPoOATRroNs AND OTHER BusiNEss
ENTERPRisES § 185 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as H. HENN, LAW OF Con-
PORATIONS].
25KRS § 271.035(h) required that the articles of incorporation contain a
statement of the shares and classes of stock subscribed to by each incorporator and
that each incorporator subscribe to at least one share. The new act only requires
that the names and addresses of each incorporator be set out in the articles of
incorporation. KRSA § 271A.270(k).2 6 Implications from other portions of the new act indicate that a partnership
cannot serve as an incorporator. See KRSA § 271A.710(153) which deals with
personal service corporations and requires that the incorporators are to be
individuals. This provision would seem to imply an intent to exclude partner-
(Continued on next page)
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although some states do permit these organizations to serve as in-
corporators the only manner in which they have done so is by
specifically providing for them by statute.27 The possibility of these
organizations serving as incorporators under the Kentucky statute
appears unlikely because the statute taken on its face, the official
comments to the Model Act, and the failure to adopt the revisions
suggested at the hearing, indicate that those who may serve as in-
corporators will be limited to persons, without regard to their age,
and domestic or foreign corporations. A different construction of the
statute, it is submitted, would clearly violate the intent of those who
drafted the Model Act and of the Kentucky General Assembly which
adopted it.
CORPoRATE NAM
In Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs,28 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals enjoined a distilling company from using the
name Churchill Downs, though there was obviously no actual market
competition between a horse racing track and a distillery; market
competition had been a prerequisite to such an action at common
law. Subsequent to the enactment of Kentucky's "same or deceptively
similar" name statute in 1946,29 Burnside Veneer Corporation sought
to have the New Burnside Veneer Corporation enjoined on the
ground that the latter name was deceptively similar. The Court
took the position that the statute merely codified the common law
and did not give exclusive rights to geographic names30-Burnside,
Kentucky being the location of both companies. The Burnside Veneer
decision was of negligible significance in Kentucky because of the
broad interpretation of the common law in Churchill Downs. Although
there is still considerable support for this interpretation, 31 adoption
of the Model Act provision32 dealing with deceptive similarities in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ships as incorporators since many personal service corporations existed as partner-
ships prior to incorporation.
27 See DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 101(A) (Supp. 1968); MIcH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 450.2(c) (1967).28 90 S.W.2d 1051 (Ky. 1986).
29KRS § 271.045(2). See Comment, Corporations-Effect of Statutes on Sim-
ilarity of Corporate Names, 44 Ky. L.J. 439 (1956).3 0 Burnside Veneer Corp. v. New Burnside Veneer Co., 247 S.W.2d 524
(Ky. 1952). See Comment, Corporations-Effect of Statutes on Similarity of Cor-
porate Names, 44 Ky. L.J. 439 (1956); Comment, Equity: Unfair Competition;
Protection of Corporate Name 25 Ky. L.J. 280 (Ky. 1937); Covington Inn Corp.
v. White Horse Tavern, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1969).
31 It has been stated that "it is questionable whether such statutes do more
than codify, for purposes of incorporation, the common law of unfair trade." W.
FLETCHEm, PRIVATE CORPOR'ATIONS § 2420 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1968).3 2 Kentucky is the first jurisdiction to adopt a provision identical to the Model
Act. MODEL Bus. COP. AcT ANN. 2D § 8 ff 8.01 (1971).
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corporate names, should expand even further the protection afforded
under the Kentucky common law of unfair trade. The new provision,
KRSA § 271A.040(c), prohibits the use of a name which is the same or
deceptively similar to the name of a domestic or foreign corporation. 33
Although this provision is identical to the old statute, most jurisdictions
have interpreted it as being applicable in all cases where there is a
likelihood of confusion; this is an expansion of the common law of
unfair trade which required market competition.A4 Thus, the emphasis
of the new provision is on protecting the public from confusion rather
than on protecting the corporation from unfair competition.35
KRSA § 271A.040(1)(b) is directed to the prevention of deception
through the use of names that mislead the public. This provision
mandates that the name shall not contain any terms which indicate
that it is organized for any purpose other than those contained in its
articles of incorporation."6 Presumably, it would prohibit, for example,
the use of a name which would suggest to the public that the cor-
poration was an instrumentality of the United States Government,
such as an administrative agency, because such a name would invoke
reliance by third parties upon the reputation of the government.
The new corporate name provisions have increased the alternatives
open to the practitioner in connection therewith. In addition to those
terms previously utilized to denote that an organization is incorpo-
rated, the term "limited" or its abbreviation, "ltd.", is now available
to corporations.37 Although such terms are still required, it is sub-
mitted that their use to denote limited liability on the part of the
owners of these enterprises is primarily traditional, and that the actual
reliance upon such terms today is open to question.38 The prior
statute prohibited the use of the term "and company" or its abbrevia-
tion 9 because it was traditionally thought to cause confusion with
partnerships. This prohibition is not included in the new act, simply
because the likelihood of confusion from the use of such terms today
is remote.
If the Secretary of State refuses to file the articles of incorporation
33 Tbis prohibition also applies to a name which has been reserved or reg-
istered under KRSA § 271A.045 and KRSA § 271A.050 respectively.34 MODEL Bus. Cor'. AcT ANN.2D § 8 f1 2 (1971).35 Id.36 KRSA § 271A.040(1) (b). It is important to note that this provision is not
inconsistent with an "all purpose clause" provided for in KRSA § 271A.014(2).
The drafters intended that all sections should be read together and that KRSA §
271A.040(1) (b) should not impair the use of an "all purpose clause." MODEL
Bus. CORP. Ac ANN. 2D § 8 2 (1971).
37KRSA § 271A.040(1) (a).38 MODELBus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 8 ff 2 (1971).
39 KBS § 271.045.
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on the ground that the name sought to be used violates one of the
provisions previously discussed, the remedy would appear to be
limited to the common law methods of reviewing administrative
decisions; mandamus would be the usual means to coerce an official
to perform his duties where he has either failed or refused to perform
them.40 Kentucky deviated from the Model Act in this respect by
deleting § 139, which defined the powers of the Secretary of State,
and § 140, which provided for direct appeal to the circuit court in
the county where the registered office is located or proposed to be
located. Section 139 was apparently deleted on the assumption that
the grant of powers to the Secretary of State would inevitably be
held unconstitutional because a sufficient standard for the exercise
of the delegated powers was not provided.41 Section 140 was similarly
omitted on the premise that without § 139 "there is no need to have
§ 140 governing appeals for determinations made by the Secretary of
State."42 Although actions of the Secretary of State in this area have
seldom been a source of litigation in Kentucky,43 it seems unfortunate
that this concise provision for appeal was not adopted since it would
have eliminated the usual problems associated with the review pro-
cedures in administrative law.44
REsEavEr NA.Nm
Under the old law, Kentucky was one of only five jurisdictions
which failed to make provision for the reservation of corporate
names.45 Reservation, despite its relatively recent origin, has become
useful in avoiding the difficulties often encountered in finding an
available name prior to incorporation. The new provision permits any
person or a domestic or foreign corporation to reserve a name for a
period of 120 days upon filing an application accompanied by a fee
of $10.00.46 If the situation necessitates reservation for a period
longer than 120 days, a slight risk exists, since renewal of any reserva-
tion must be filed on the day following the statutory period and there
are no provisions for pre-filing.47 One method of avoiding these risks,
40 See Comment, Role of the Secretary of State Under the South Carolina
Business Corporation Act of 1962, S.C.L. REV. 541, 548 (1963).4 1 LEGISLATIvE HEAIUNO, supra note 19, at 190.
42 LEGISLATrVE HEARING, supra note 19, at 211.
43 See Dorman v. Banker's Trust Co's. Receiver, 82 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1935);
Cheaney v. Brunner, 132 S.W. 167 (Ky. 1910).44 For a discussion of problems associated with state administrative review
procedures, see K. DAvis, ADMINmSTATrI LAW TXT 458 (3d ed. 1972).
45 MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. 2D § 9 f 3.03 (1971).
46 KRSA § 271A.045; KRSA § 271A.630(5). The rights acquired by reserva-
tion may be transferred by filing written notice with the Secretary of State. KRSA
§ 271A.630 (6). (Continued on next page)
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at some additional expense, is the creation of a name-holding corpora-
tion.48 However, the principal purpose of reservation procedures is
to prohibit the use of a sham corporation to obtain rights to the
particular name of a proposed domestic corporation.4 9 The name-
holding corporation method is therefore contrary to the intent of the
reservation procedures and may result in requiring those with a
legitimate need to buy the name from a sham corporation.
REGISTRAION OF CooRPRATE NAME
The new registration provision is intended as a convenience for
an existing foreign corporation which plans to extend its area of
operations. 50 It enables a foreign corporation to protect a name for
a period greater than that of reservation by filing an application with
the Secretary of State which continues in effect from the date of
filing until December 31 of each year. Renewal of the registration
is permitted by annually filing an application for renewal and pay-
ment of the required fee.51 In contrast to the reserved name pro-
visions, there is no risk of lapse in connection with the registered name;
however the latter is available only to foreign corporations.
PURPOSES OF THE CORPORATION
Under the old statute, KRS § 271.035(b) required the purpose for
which a corporation was formed to be stated in the articles of in-
corporation while KRS § 271.025 permitted the formation of a
corporation for "any lawful purpose." Thus, although the statutes
permitted a corporation to be formed for "any lawful purpose," that
purpose had to be stated in the articles of incorporation, thereby
precluding the organizer from providing in the articles that the cor-
poration was organized for the transaction of any or all lawful
business. As Professor Willburt Ham has noted in an article discussing
suggestions for modernizing Kentucky corporation law, "this language
taken literally suggests that a Kentucky corporation must confine
itself to a single line of business activity";52 he stated that "such a
(Footnote continued -rom preceding page)
47 MoDm Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. 2D § 9 Uf 2 (1971).
48 Id.
49 See Comment, Corporate Name; Registered Office and Agent; Service of
Process, 15 S.C.L. 1Ev. 492, 500 (1963).50 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 10 Uf 2 (1971). The fee for this service
is $1.00 per month or fraction thereof from the date of filing and December 31 of
the year in which the application is filed. KRSA § 271A.050(2) (b).
51 KRSA § 271A.055. The fee for renewal is $12.00 per year.52 Ham, Suggestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation Law
to Meet the Needs of Close Corporations, 52 Ky. L.J. 527, 534 (1964).
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restriction would run counter to the customary authorization in modem
corporation statutes for corporations to be formed 'for any lawful
purpose'." 53
This possible restriction has been abolished by KRSA § 271A.270(c)
which provides:
The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized
may be stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all
lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under
this Act.54
This section together with KRSA § 271A.015(2) which allows a cor-
poration to be organized for "any lawful purpose" provides consider-
able flexibility. It enables the draftsman of the articles of incorpora-
tion to state the purposes of the corporation to be the transaction
of any lawful business. This lets the draftsman complete his task
without resorting to clairvoyance to predict possible areas of future
corporate expansion and eliminates the need for subsequent amend-
ments as well.
It is interesting to note that at the public hearings prior to adoption
of the new "any lawful purposes" provision, concern was expressed
over a possible conflict with § 192 of the Kentucky Constitution: 55
No corporation shall engage in business other than that expressly
authorized by its charter, or the law under which it may have been
or hereafter may be organized (emphasis supplied) .... "
However, it appears that the statutory and constitutional provisions
are compatible because a corporation should be "expressly authorized"
by statute to carry on business for any lawful purpose. In any event,
if Kentucky's corporation law is to promote modem corporate flex-
ibility, it is essential that corporations may be formed for "any lawful
purpose." A predicament would arise if the constitutional provisions
were to be interpreted to preclude an "any lawful purpose" clause
because of the difficulty in amending the Kentucky Constitution5
DuPATIoN
KRSA § 271A.270(b) is identical to prior Kentucky law58 and
requires that the duration of the corporation, which may be perpetual,
53 Id.
54 KRSA § 271A.270(c).5 5 LEGisLATvE H-AziNa, supra note 19, at 126.
" KY. CONST. § 192.
57 KENTucKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCHt ComMIssIoN, IEOI/miAfoNAL BULL.
No. 52, A ComAIUsoN. .. THE PxsEENT, THE IhoposED KmErucKY CoNsTU-
TION (1966).58Y RS § 271.035(c).
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be stated in the articles of incorporation. It is probably the better
practice to make the duration of a corporation perpetual because of
unnecessary problems resulting from a stated duration. For example,
creditors could hold corporate shareholders or officers personally liable
if the charter expiration date was overlooked and the corporation
continued to do business. In practice, it is routine to use perpetual
duration and some jurisdictions state that the duration of a corpora-
tion is perpetual unless otherwise provided.59
POWERS
After the corporation is formed, the entity possesses powers which
are necessarily and inseparably incident to every corporation. These
powers as described by Blackstone are said to be inherent in corporate
existence and include the power "to have perpetual succession; to
sue and be sued; to purchase lands; to have a common seal; and to
make by-laws." 60 Today, however, the powers enumerated in modem
corporation statutes go far beyond the basic powers recognized by
Blackstone. KRSA § 271A.020 is an example of a modem statute and
accordingly enumerates 17 powers which are incident to each cor-
poration formed thereunder. In comparison to the old Kentucky
statute,(" the new law represents an expansion of corporate powers in
several respects; these changes will be analyzed in the discussion
that follows.
First, KRSA § 271A.020(4) empowers a corporation to purchase,
take, receive, lease, or otherwise deal in and with, real or personal
property, or any interest therein, wherever situated. It is important to
note that this provision imposes no restrictions on real property with
respect to acquisition or use. The official comments to the Model Act
explain that this provision is in accord with the modem concept that
complete freedom of property rights should be conferred in the
incorporating statute.6 2 The policy of this Model Act provision is
overshadowed by § 192 of the Kentucky Constitution which provides
that a corporation shall not hold any real estate, except such as may
be proper and necessary for carrying on its legitimate business, for a
period longer than five years, under penalty of escheat. 63 The purpose
of this provision, conceived in 1891 when corporations were viewed
with skepticism, was to prevent large corporations from buying up
59 DEL. CODE AiN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAw
§ 402(a) (1968).60 1 W. BLACKSTONE:, CommmMNrTAms 475-76.61 KRS § 271.125.62 MorE Bus. CoRP. Aar Ar. 2D § 4d f1 2 (1971).
63 KY. CONST. § 192.
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and holding tracts of Kentucky land.6 4 In view of the compelling
constitutional mandate it was necessary to retain this property re-
striction in the new act in KRSA § 271A.705. The harshness of this
constitutional provision has been somewhat mitigated by the Court
of Appeals' construction of the phrase "proper and necessary" as being
something less than essential or indispensable to the corporate
business.6 5 Thus the limitations on corporate real estate holdings,
though eroded to some extent, are nonetheless a potential problem
for Kentucky corporations and absent the remote possibility of a
constitutional amendment,66 will continue to hamper Kentucky's
corporate climate.
The second provision expanding corporate powers under the new
act is KRSA § 271A.020(b) which allows the corporation to lend money
and use its credit to assist its employees. This provision permits the
corporation to make loans to employees or to guarantee employee
loans from third parties but is limited by the requirement that the
loans assist the corporations in attracting and retaining the services
of qualified persons. 67
The third significant expansion is found in the power to indemnify
"directors and officers." Although this power is not included in the
list of 17 powers, it is covered specifically in KRSA § 271A.025 and
represents a significant improvement over previous law.68 First, it
lays to rest the contention that the corporation 69 is limited to in-
demnification of "directors and officers" by expanding the provision
to include "any person" who by virtue of his association with the
corporation is subjected to liability. It further provides that the
power of indemnification is discretionary with the corporation.
64Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 288
S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1956).
65 Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 288
S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1936); German Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 793 (Ky.
1911).66 An amendment to increase the time period in § 192 of the Kentucky
Constitution to 25 years was adopted by the Constitutional Revision Assembly
in 1966 after lengthy debate. The death knell for such a revision was, however,
subsequently sounded by the electorate. See KEnvcKY LEGISLATIvE RESEAnCH
CoM4IssioN, INFORMATiONAL BuLL. No. 52, A COMPaON ... THE PRESENT,
TnE PROPOSED KENTUCKY CONsTrruTIoN (1966).
67 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 4(f) f1 2 (1971).
68 KRS § 271.125(11); KRS § 271.375.
69 KRS § 271.125(11) referred to the power of indemnification only in terms
of directors and officers.
70TBE MODEL Bus. Corn'. ACT ANN. 2D § 4 f1 3.03 (1971) states that in
Kentucky, under the prior law, the corporation bad a duty to indemnify to the
extent of statutory authority. Kentucky has also been described as a jurisdiction
which provides a right to reimbursement in all circumstances except where there
has been negligence, misconduct, or an unsuccessful defense by the indemnitee.
23 LAw & CoITmT. PROB. 330 (1948).
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There are two instances where exceptions to the discretionary power
exist. First, in the event of a successful defense, there is a right of
action for reimbursement of the reasonable litigation expenses of the
party concerned. 7' Second, even where there has been an adjudication
of liability, the court in which the action is brought may determine
in view of all the circumstances that such person is fairly and reason-
ably entitled to indemnification for the expenses to the extent the
court shall deem proper.72 Indemnification is permitted in third
party73 and shareholder derivative suits74 but both require some
corporate action to exercise the power. The corporate action may be
by charter or by-law granting blanket indemnity in selected instances,
or alternatively by corporate action in a particular instance.75
Kentucky resolved any doubts concerning the powers of indemnifi-
cation subsequent to merger or consolidation by adding to this
section76 a provision recently enacted in Delaware. 77 This provision
expands the term "corporation" to include entities absorbed in con-
solidation or merger as well as the resulting or surviving corporation,
thus enabling any person who served a constituent corporation to
stand in the same position after the consolidation as before. Clearly,
under this provision the right to indemnification survives the merger
or consolidation.
Although corporate powers enumerated in the act need not be
set forth in the articles, 78 experience with a similar provision under
prior law 79 reveals a tendency to be overcautious and list specific
powers. One reason given for this precaution is that it serves as a
safeguard against the effect of a subsequent statutory amendment
limiting a power allowed at the time of incorporation.80 Another
argument in favor of listing statutory powers is to provide the reader
of the articles of incorporation with a "complete document."
BEGIsTEEm OFFIcE AND Ac='r
The registered office of a corporation may or may not be the same
as its place of business.8 ' The registered agent at such office must be
a resident individual or a domestic or foreign corporation authorized
71 KRSA § 271A.025(3).
72 KRSA § 271A.025(2).
73 KRSA § 271A.025(1).
74 KRSA § 271A.025(2).
75 KRSA § 271A.025(2); KRSA § 271A.025(4).
76 KRSA § 271A.025(8).
77 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(h) (Supp. 1970).
78 KRSA § 271A.270(2).
79 fIRS § 271.035(3).80 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN 2D § 54 fI 2 (1971).8 1 KRSA § 271A.060(1).
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to transact business in this state.82 But whether or not the agent is an
individual or a corporation, the agent's business office must be the
registered office. In other words, the office which the corporation
chooses to have as its registered office must also be the business
residence of its agent.83 Practically, this means that there will be
more attorneys' offices listed as registered offices of corporations. The
registered office or registered agent or both may be changed by filing
a statement with the Secretary of State84 accompanied by a fee of
$10.00.85
MINIMUM CAPrrAL REQUIREMENTS
Heretofore, it was necessary to note in the articles of incorporation
the amount of capital with which the corporation was to begin
business;88 in addition, the statute provided that $1,000 was the
minimum amount of such capital.87 As a condition precedent to doing
business the amount stated in the articles of incorporation was re-
quired to be "fully paid in."8 8 The situation was aptly characterized
by Justice Palmore in Tri-State Developers, Inc. v. Moore:s9 "one
may start business on a shoestring in Kentucky, but if it is a corporate
business the shoestring must be worth $1,000." Under the new law
it is no longer necessary to state the beginning capital in the articles,
nor are there any minimum requirements as to the amount of
capital °0 The traditional concept of minimum capital, which was
developed to protect corporation creditors, has no place in today's
modem corporation statutes because $1,000 offers no realistic pro-
tection to creditors. In this respect the new statute represents a
significant modernization of Kentucky law.
FnimNG AND CoRPoR ExisTcE
The articles of incorporation must be delivered to the Secretary
of State in triplicate.91 Although the Model Act requires only central
filing with the Secretary of State, 92 Kentucky retained its dual filing
82 KRSA § 271A.060(2).
88id.
84 KRSA § 271A.065.
s KRSA § 271A.630(7).
86KRS § 271.035(g).
87KRS § 271.085.
88KRS § 271.095(1) (b). Failure to pay in the $1,000 capital prior to begin-
ning business resulted in unlimited liability for corporate debts by participating
officers and non-dissenting directors.
89343 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Ky. 1961).
90KRSA § 271A.710(165) specifically repealed the entire previous general
corporation law, KRS ch. 271.
91 KRSA § 271A.275(1).92MoDEL Bus. Corp. AcT ANN. 2D § 55 II 2 (1971).
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system which provides that a copy of the articles must be filed and
recorded with the county clerk of the county in which the registered
office of the corporation is situated.93 Presumably, local filing was
originally necessary as a convenience to the public because of slow
methods of travel and communication. It appears that the primary
reason for maintaining the requirement is to provide a source of
revenue for Kentucky counties.
The old general corporation law stated that when the articles of
incorporation were filed and the certificate of incorporation was
issued by the Secretary of State, corporate existence began.94 The
statute further provided that prior to transacting business, it was
necessary for the corporation to comply with the following conditions
precedent: a) file the articles with the county clerk; b) have the
minimum capital fully paid in; c) elect a board of directors; and d)
establish a registered office and process agent.9 5 The penalty for
failure to comply with these conditions precedent was statutorily
defined for participating officers and non-dissenting directors; they
were to be jointly and severally liable for debts or liabilities arising
from the transaction of business in violation of these provisions.96 The
anomalous consequence of these two provisions was that a corporation
could begin business without officers or an elected board of directors
in violation of the conditions precedent; but there was potential liabil-
ity although there were no directors or officers on whom to impose such
liability. This situation existed as a result of not requiring that the
initial board of directors be named in the articles of incorporation.
The problem was presented to the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
the case of Tri-State Developers, Inc. v. Moore.97 The Court elim-
inated this hiatus by finding that those who purported to act for a
corporation before its governing body was constituted were "de facto"
officers and were personally liable for debts incurred by the corpora-
tion since they failed to comply with minimum capital requirements.
The new act abolishes problems of this nature by requiring that
the initial board of directors be named in the articles of incorpora-
tion.98 The new act deletes two other conditions precedent by
eliminating minimum capital requirements9 and requiring that the
process agent and registered office be listed in the articles. 00 The
9 3 KRSA § 271A.275(2).
94]KRS § 271.065.
Or KRS § 271.095(1).
96 KRS § 271.095(2).
97 343 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).
98 KRSA § 271A.270(1)(j).
90 KRSA ch. 271A has no minimum capital requirements.
100 KRSA § 271A.270(i).
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only vestige of the old conditions precedent to doing business is the
filing of the articles with the county clerk.' 01 Failure to comply with
the local filing requirement no longer carries the sanction of personal
liability; the new statute provides:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate
existence shall begin and such certificate of incorporation shall be
conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be
performed by the corporation have been complied with . ... 102
Failure to comply with local filing would, however, fall within the
penalty section of the act,103 which states that any corporation, officer,
director or agent which violates a provision of chapter 271A shall be
fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for each offense.104
The local filing fees are insignificant in contrast to the potential fines,
and care should be taken to assure compliance.
ORGANIZATIONAL METINGS
The old corporation law required two organizational meetings
after the certificate of incorporation was issued. 0 5 The first was a
meeting of shareholders called by the incorporators primarily for the
purpose of electing directors and making by-laws when the articles did
not provide for the directors to make the by-laws. 06 Kentucky's
prior statute was "permissive" in this respect in that it allowed the
shareholders to delegate to the directors the authority to make by-
laws if the articles so provided. 0 7 The second was a meeting of the
newly elected board of directors for the purpose of electing officers,
transacting necessary business, and if provided in the articles, making
by-laws.10 8
The new provision recognizes that by-laws are immediately
necessary for the proper functioning of a recently organized corpora-
tion and provides that initial by-laws are to be made by the direc-
tors.'0 9 Since the directors usually make the by-laws, the necessity
of delegating the powers is now eliminated. Future powers with
respect to by-laws will also vest in the directors unless reserved to
the shareholders in the articles." 0 Note, however, that any such
101 KRSA § 271A.275(2).
102 KRSA § 271A.280.
103 KRSA § 271A.640(2).
104 Id.
105 KRS § 271.345.
106 KRS § 271.345(2).
107 Id.
108 KRS § 271.345(3).
lo9 KRSA § 271A.285.
110 Id.
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reservations will be effective only after the initial by-laws are adopted
by the board.
Under the new act, only one organizational meeting is required
after the articles have been filed."n This meeting is the equivalent
of the second organizational meeting under the old statute. The first
meeting under the old statute is unnecessary since the directors are
named in the articles of incorporation. 1 2 The early naming of direc-
tors and the elimination of the necessity of expressly delegating
authority to the directors to make by-laws have significantly simplified
the task of the corporate organizer.
Under the old act corporate action was permitted without organi-
zational meetings if written consent was given by those who had the
authority to act at a particular meeting." 3 This method for taking
corporate action is only feasible for the small corporation, and as a
practical matter, larger corporations are still required to hold meet-
ings. Those corporations which could previously take advantage of
the written consent statutes may continue to do so since the new act
includes a similar provision." 4 One departure from the prior statute
deals with shareholder action without a meeting in the case of merger,
consolidation, or transfers of corporate assets." 5 Previously, written
consent of the shareholders was not permitted in these areas; but the
new act has no comparable limitations. When written consent is used
in lieu of meetings, care should be taken to comply specifically with
the applicable provisions since they are usually strictly construed;
informal action which would have been sustained under prior case
law may be invalidated under these new provisions." 6
ULTRA VIBES Acs
The term "ultra vires" is possibly one of the most loosely used
terms in the field of corporation law. An ultra vires act, according to
the strict construction of the term, is one not within the expressed or
implied powers of the corporation as established by its charter,
statute, or the common law.17
The doctrine of ultra vires is rooted in the traditional theory that
"I KRSA § 271A.285.
112 KRSA § 271A.270(1) (j).
11"KRS § 271.345(4) (e) deals with directors and KRS § 271.405, with
shareholders.
114 KRSA § 271A.220; KRSA § 271A.665.
115 The old statutory provisions were KRS § 271.405, KBS § 271.415, and
KRS § 271.470.
116 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATONS § 208. See Brown Deer v. Milwaukee,
114 N.W.2d 493 (Wis. 1962), cert. denied, 871 U.S. 902 (1962).
117 W. FLETcHEn, PtrVATE CORPORATIONS § 3399 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1964); see Wilson v. Louisville Trust Co., 46 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Ky. 1932).
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the corporation, because it is an artificial entity of the state, is limited
to the authority granted in its charter."18 The impact of the doctrine
has been so drastically reduced by judicial acceptance of the doctrine
of implied powers that the courts today will allow implied authority
to be expanded almost indefinitely." 0 In addition, a majority of
states now have specific legislation dealing with the problems of
ultra vires.120 Such legislation is based on the theory that corpora-
tions, like natural persons, should be responsible for their acts and
should not be able to assert the defense of lack of corporate powers
when dealing with third persons.121
Although litigation involving the defense of ultra vires has declined
substantially in recent years, there is still a need for provisions in
modem corporation codes to deal specifically with ultra vires acts.' 22
Heretofore, Kentucky had no statutory provisions dealing with the
doctrine; when the problems arose, the courts were forced to consider
the scope of the purposes and the express and incidental powers of
the corporation. 2 3 The new corporation law specifically abolishes the
doctrine of ultra vires except for the following situations: 2 4
(1) shareholders injunction proceedings against the corpora-
tion;12 5
(2) actions by the corporation or those suing in its behalf
against its officers or directors; 12 6 and
(3) proceedings by the state to dissolve or to enjoin the cor-
poration.'2
7
These provisions protect shareholders by enabling them to enjoin
unauthorized acts and to hold officers and directors liable for resulting
118 H. HyNN, LAw oF ComonAmoNs § 184.
119 Jacksonville Mayport, Pablo Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514
(1896); but see Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry & Game Co.,
229 S.W. 813 (Mo. 1921).
120 Prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act all but
eight states had legislation dealing with the doctrine. MoPEr Bus. Corn,. Acr
ANN. 2D § 7 II 2.04 (1971).
121 MoDEL Bus. Corn,. Act ANN. 2b § 7 ff 2 (1971).
122 Ham, Ultra Vires Contracts Under Modem Corporation Legislation, 46
Ky. L.J. 215 (1958).
123 See In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Ky. 1935), affd,
83 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Louisville Trust Co., 46 S.W.2d 767 (Ky.
1932); Laurel County v. Howard, 224 S.W. 762 (Ky. 1920).
124 H. HENN, LAW OF CosRpoaAXuIoNs § 184. For construction of similar
provisions, see Puerto Rico Indus. Dev. Co. v. Miller Mfg. Corp., 173 F. Supp.
596 (S.D. IlM. 1959); Patterson Monument Co. v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park,
Inc., 128 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1957).
125 KRSA § 271A.085(1).
126 KRSA § 271A.035(2).
127 KRSA § 271A.035(3).
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damages. If the shareholders successfully enjoin the performance of
an unauthorized contract, the court may award damages to either
the corporation or to the other party to the contract. 2 8 Both the
corporation and third parties are precluded from raising the defense
with respect to wholly executory contracts, thus changing the case
law that allowed ultra vires as a defense to either party where neither
had performed.129 The estoppel approach 130 used by those who
benefited from a contract is abolished and the defense is precluded
without regard to benefit or performance.' 3' The new provision also
protects the interests of the state by enabling the Attorney General
to bring proceedings either to enjoin unauthorized transactions or to
dissolve the corporation engaging in unlawful acts.1
32
This new section on ultra vires is a significant improvement. It
appears to give full protection to persons dealing with the corporation,
although a court may, where equitable, enjoin an unperformed con-
tract without prejudice to the rights of the parties to seek compensa-
tion for loss or damage sustained.
DEFECrrVE INCOBPoRATION
The issue in a case of defective incorporation is whether failure
to comply with statutory procedures allows third parties or the state
to challenge corporate existence. At common law, the existence of a
corporation de jure was not subject to challenge since it had complied
with the statutory requirements for incorporation. 33 However, in
those cases where the corporation failed to comply with the statutory
requirements, the courts have consistently recognized de facto
existence, making such entities invulnerable to attack, except in a
direct proceeding by the state. Attempts to impose individual liability
on a corporation's officers and directors have been unsuccessful where
the requirements of de facto existence are met.' 34 If the corporation
did not have de facto existence, the courts sometimes used estoppel
to preclude a collateral attack on corporate existence. The application
of this concept required the elements of "holding out" and reliance
128 MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT ANN. 2D § 7 ff 2 (1971).
129 Id.
130 See Liberty Coal Mining Co. v. Frankel Coal Co., 268 S.W. 280 (Ky.
1925); Laurel Co. v. Howard, 224 S.W. 762 (Ky. 1920).
131 MODEL Bus. CoRp. Aar ANN. 2D § 7 U 2 (1971).
132 Id.
133 H. HENN, La-w or ConroPn~roNs § 189.
134 These requirements are: (1) a valid law under which the corporation
could have been formed; (2) an attempt to organize thereunder; (3) actual user
of corporate franchise; and (4) colorable or good faith attempt to organize. See
H. HIN, LAw or CoOPxoTxoNs § 140.
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as well as facts and circumstances which permitted its use to achieve
equity.135
Under previous Kentucky law, corporate existence was unassail-
able once the certificate of incorporation had been issued, except in
an action by the state to dissolve, wind-up and terminate a corpora-
tion.136 If, however, the corporation had not filed its articles of in-
corporation and had no certificate, it was unclear whether or not the
courts would recognize de facto existence. Even though the articles
of incorporation had not been filed, an argument for estoppel under
prior law could be based on the case of Cranson v. International
Business Machines Corp.'3 7 In Cranson, the Maryland court, con-
struing a statute comparable to the previous Kentucky law, held that
an attorney's oversight in failing to file the articles did not preclude
the recognition of corporate existence by estoppel.138 Whatever the
status of these concepts under prior law, the new act, KRSA §
271A.670, provides that "all persons who assume to act as a corpora-
tion without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for
all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof." In
discussing this provision, the official comments to the Model Act
indicate that "this section is designed to prohibit the application of
any theory of de facto incorporation."139 The comments recognize
that there no longer exists a reason for the de facto doctrine in modern
corporation statutes since the process of de jure incorporation is
simple and clear.' 40
Regarding the estoppel doctrine under the new law, at least one
court has held that upon issuance of the certificate of incorporation
individual liability ceases and the corporation becomes liable for its
acts. The decision was based on statutory provisions identical to
KRSA § 271A.280, which provides that the issuance of the certificate
of incorporation is conclusive evidence of corporate existence, and
KRSA § 271A.670 which imposes liability on those who assume to act
as a corporation without authority to do so. In that case, Robertson
v. Levy,141 a fatal blow was dealt by the District of Columbia court
to both the de facto and estoppel concepts:
135 The doctrine does not conform to the requirement of pure estoppel; it is
recognized as a form of quasi-estoppel. See Comment, Corporations-De Facto
Corporations-Estoppel-Model Business Corporation Act, 43 N.C. L. REv. 206(1964).
136KRS § 271.105.
137 200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964).
138 See Comment, Corporation by Estoppel, 10 VrrL. L. REv. 166 (1964).
139 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2D § 146 ff 2 (1971).
140 Id.
141 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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[T]he impact of these sections, when considered together, is to
eliminate the concepts of estoppel and de facto corporateness
under the Business Corporation Act of the District of Columbia.142
The court's interpretation of the statutes in Robertson appears to be
the better approach. Elimination of both estoppel and de facto
doctrines would improve Kentucky corporation law. Their applica-
tion has been unreliable and unpredictable. 143 Further, their abolition
places the risk of non-compliance where it should be: on the in-
corporators rather than innocent third parties dealing with the cor-
poration.'4
DisREOGA OF CORo PTENESS-PIcENG THE CORPORATE VEIr
The converse of recognition of corporate existence in spite of
defective incorporation is the disregard of corporateness and con-
current limited liability, even though there was compliance with the
formalities necessary to achieve such status.145 A discussion of the
multifarious decisions dealing with "piercing the corporate veil" will
not be attempted herein, but it is suggested that the new act could
have an impact on at least one aspect of this concept. The judiciary
appears to have increased latitude in the consideration of inadequate
capitalization as a criterion in disregarding corporateness. Adequate
capitalization, it is submitted, generally seems to depend upon the
facts of a given case and the previous minimum capital of $1,000
arguably indicated that the legislature had defined adequate capital
by statute. If the minimum capital had been paid in, there was no
question for the judiciary even though the sum was insignificant when
compared to the business to be transacted and the risks of loss. Re-
moval of the minimum capital requirement under our present cor-
poration statute resolves any possible conflict between the judiciary
and the legislature and frees the Kentucky courts from examining the
adequacy of capitalization in determining corporateness.
342 Id. at 447. This case provides an excellent discussion of the concepts of
the de facto doctrine and the corporation by estoppel.
143 Frey, Legal Analysis and the De Facto Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1153,
1180 (1952).
144 Comment, supra note 138, at 171.
145 H. HENN, LAw OF CoPxonTioNs § 138.
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CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Business Corporation Act is a substantial improve-
ment over the previous corporate law. It enables the corporate
organizer to accomplish his task more easily and provides him with
clear concise guidelines for implementation. The expansion of powers,
name reservation and registration, and the abolition of stated capital
are characteristics of a progressive corporate domicile and places
Kentucky in a competetive position with other states. The new act
reflects the necessary flexibility and simplicity demanded by modem
corporate entities and promises an increase in corporate activity
within the Commonwealth.
Charles E. Shivel, Jr.
